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Abstract. This article analyzes the ways in which public sector service providers may use service 
delivery failure as a way of securing resources. In tactical service failure, an organization tactically 
delivers non-adequate service, so as to project a media image of being harmed by its funding 
cuts. Analyzing this process enables new insight into both public funding and provider to funder 
(P2F) marketing and selling. This research uses a single case study method to confirm the 
existence of the phenomenon first detected through long-term media analysis. To explore the 
single case, the authors interviewed a former city official who participated in tactical service failure 
processes and their marketing. The article shows how and why service providers may opt for this 
tactic, as well as the potential gains and pitfalls of utilizing it. It also provides new insight into how 
media connections are used to influence public funding decisions. 
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”Co-operating with media during a challenging change situation within the basic health 
care sector: During a radical change of the working practices within basic health care in a middle-
sized Finnish municipality (during the years of 2010-2014), the co-operation between media and 
the health care service provider was strategic and target-oriented. The core communication was 
based on facts that addressed issues that we define as tactical service failures: delay in service 
availability, narrow range of services, costly services and service impact.  To create urgency in 
the decision-making process, communication was sometimes provocative and always upfront. 
The change process was made visible to citizens and at the same time helped the decision-
makers. Unfortunately, there were some tensions between the health care provider and the 
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politicians and the visibility in media declined. How this affected the funding opportunities remains 
to be seen.” (Email interview data, 2015, translated by [first author]) 
 
In this article, based on a case study and media-analysis, we use theories from selling and 
marketing to analyze the way in which public services’ funding may be tied to their intentionally 
performing less than adequate service. Unlike corporations that rely on investor trust or on 
customer loyalty gained as a result of high-quality services and customer satisfaction (Caruana, 
2002), public service providers may sometimes benefit from customer perceptions of inefficiency 
or inferior service quality. This is because such an image may get them extra funding, especially 
during times of crisis. The situation is often the result of a blurry view on who is their primary 
customer. A customer has the power to choose and not to choose, when paying directly for e.g., 
health care. When the paying customer is not the consumer of the service, the actual consumer 
of the service has another position and other “sales techniques” should be used (e.g., Fountain, 
2001). An example of this situation is a municipality paying for the health care of its citizens (the 
service’s consumers, to whom we in this article refer to as the primary customers of a service). 
This article discusses the situation where those consumers need to be leveraged by the public 
service provider to put pressure on the customer who pays their bill. 
 
It has been long recognized that the primary market of public sector service providers may well 
be the oversight bodies that decide on their funding (Nutt & Backoff, 1993; Nutt, 2006). Yet, 
surprisingly enough, the ways in which such organizations use marketing techniques to affect 
those oversight bodies remain understudied. This may partially be because such organizations 
have in the past been able to use coercive techniques of customer management, with little need 
for marketing (Nutt & Backoff, 1993). Nowadays, however, the market is open to competition in 
an unprecedented manner, and public sector service providers have to justify their costs – and 
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sometimes even their existences. At the same time, they rarely have sufficient marketing budgets 
or personnel of their own. 
 
A core expectation of public service is that it is equal for all. In truth, prioritization nevertheless 
has to be made very often, as resources are never infinite (Aberbach & Christensen, 2005). 
Expectations of equality and quality therefore become image issues. The image of a service 
provider largely arises from its organization, culture and members, the type of service it provides, 
as well as its service quality and market segments (Normann, 2001). In many public services, the 
importance of the provided service can come to question, as commercial competitors are able to 
provide higher quality. Likewise, the primary customers’ experiences with the provided service 
may not reach the ears of those who pay for the service. Primary customers refer to consumers 
of a public service. It is in this situation where tactical service failure (TSF), an intentional media 
exposure of a large-scale failure, enters the scene. It arises from the thought that the actual users 
of the service are not able to sufficiently influence those who pay for it all (e.g., municipality 
governments), and more drastic methods are needed. Here, we discuss the TSF process, 
situations that foster such an institutional begging-threatening combo, and the advantages and 
risks connected to such marketing and selling behavior. 
 
 “We realized public funding alone wasn’t enough to get the job done.” 
 
“The health care sector [and its development or funding cuts] became a weapon used 
between political groups.” 
 
It is an old adage in selling that even a great product does not sell itself, but needs someone or 
something able to sell it. Publicly produced or procured services to citizens are even more difficult 
to provide without an encounter between the service provider and customer. This can especially 
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be seen in the context of public sector service providers. For example, public health care is seen 
as cumbersome, slow and inefficient when compared to its more high-priced private cousins. The 
public medical services do not however need to be sold, as the demand seems to exceed supply. 
The result is that the public provider fails in one crucial criterion – efficiency – and that is what 
matters. The brand of the public service provider is unclear and bad, sometimes simply just 
because it is a public service (Bok, 2001; Van de Walle, 2016). It becomes the option of mostly 
for those who cannot pay for the service offered by the private sector. In other words, it is 
perceived as “welfare” rather than standard municipal service, and that is a sure way to 
continuously lose public funding. 
 
Because the lack of sufficient financial support is what causes the troubles in the first place, the 
downward spiral eventually feeds itself. When combined with inaccurate or insufficient metrics 
(e.g., patient turnover time instead of the health of the patients sent home), it can become fatal 
for the organization. In sales terms, this can be considered a situation where the primary customer 
loses its trust in the service provider and starts to just look for significant discounts, not more 
value. With the concept of “value” being very ambiguous within the public sector, it is easy for the 
funders to turn to profit-based metrics instead. They have to justify their spending decisions for 
both the public and to each other, and make claims on the value their investments into particular 
services will supposedly create (O’Flynn, 2007). This mismatch between purpose and 
measurement is far from optimal from the side of the actual service provider. Feeling short-
changed and unappreciated, providers may turn to displays of problems. They use a cultural 
branding strategy (see Oswald, 2015) that broadcasts their challenges while highlighting that the 





“At first the politicians were enthusiastic about the external funding, but as time went by, 
people became envious that we were able to organize the extra teams, without which real 
development could not have been done. … So after a while, our public core funding started to 
see corresponding cuts, and [resources that had been already promised were] instead denied 
from us.” 
 
“The officials were saying [during budget planning] that we were inefficient and could not 
handle our financial planning. So we had to fight that with public facts. … Then, they forbid us 
from publishing the assessment results.” 
 
Public sector service providers rarely focus on financial profit. Instead, they are either cost-
efficient, they fulfill community obligations towards citizens (aiming at a “social profit”), or are both 
cost-efficient and socially oriented (Austin, Stevenson & Wei-Skillern, 2006; van Helden & 
Reichard, 2016). The key problem lies in the fact that the social profit (also known as, e.g., social 
impact) is extremely hard to measure, especially on the level of a singular operator’s influence. 
For example, metrics for schools and universities can include the number of graduates and the 
grades with which they graduate, but can rarely take into account skills such as a continued 
interest in learning or self-improvement. Grades can, however, be given for very different amounts 
and qualities of work. Likewise, even shared tests like SATs can become something that turns 
into a focus of training in a manner that disrupts the learning of everything else. It is furthermore 
a very different thing to analyze e.g., the effectiveness of public health service by time spent per 
patient, by money spent, or by how many more healthy years a senior citizen gets. 
 
As a result of this problem with metrics, many public service providers are likely targets of 
repeated funding cuts. They therefore must convince others of their relevance, despite the 
challenge of the metrics. Because the situation resembles very closely, in some factors, other 
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forms of selling, we consider it too to be a kind of sales process. We call it provider-to-funder 
selling (P2F). It is a calculated (or sometimes just desperate) type of pitching. Most of the time 
this selling takes place through normal channels such as formal reports and positive media 
publicity. In times of drastic cuts, however, the tone dramatically changes and TSF steps in. The 
pitch turns into one of three types, all of which seek the same thing: sufficient funding. Firstlly, the 
provider may use already happened large-scale failures as case examples on why it needs more 
money (or the cancellation of impending cuts). Secondly, it may threaten that future failures will 
take place if the funding is not secured. And thirdly, it may even intentionally arrange an artificial, 
visible service failure, in order to use that failure to demonstrate that its needs are critical. 
 
All the three forms include a calculated risk. On the one hand, if the organization does not resort 
to such tactics crucial funding can be denied, as its need is not seen well enough. On the other 
hand, the organization may just end up feeding the image of itself as obsolete, incompetent, and 
rightfully deserving to be put down. TSF is essentially a balancing act between need and risk. 
Organizations therefore try and select only some functions where they fail, in order to be able to 
still show enough core competences to keep themselves at least partially credible as providers of 
service. 
 
Through our analysis, we answer the research question why is it sometimes financially 
advantageous for public service providers to fail at providing adequate service for their 
customers, and how do they sell that failure in order to get more funding? With it, we make 
a contribution to the study of not only public service failure research (James et al., 2016; Van de 
Walle, 2016), but also questions of reverse marketing (e.g., Leenders & Blenkhorn, 1988), the 
relationship between public organizations and the media (e.g., Liu & Horsley, 2007), and 





This article is structured as follows: after the methodology section, we summarize the findings of 
this study. Then, we analyze three key points: the tactics of TSF, how service failure is used in 
selling a service’s importance, and the sales pitch of failure itself. In discussion, we outline the 
functions and implications of tactical service failure, and then conclude with remarks on public 
sector’s provider-to-funder marketing. These are done in the context of illustrative quotes from 
the interviews, showing how each point follows from both existing theory and the field data. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
The initial data for this article were collected through a two-year long media analysis. It was found 
as a target of opportunity, when [the first author] noticed that news of funding cuts tended to be 
immediately followed by media exposure of crucial failures in service, always blaming the 
aforementioned cuts for the problems. During the two-year period, [first author] systematically 
observed 15 major Finnish news sources in order to locate more instances of similar reports, 
assisted by [the second author, third author] and several colleagues. Emphasis was based on 
large-scale cases that were shared on social media (e.g., Facebook, Twitter), which were 
systematically noted in the data collection as particularly significant. In our opinion those best 
represent the fact that tactical service failure cases appear to be intentionally tailored to create 
maximal visibility. In the current day and age, this means viral spreading in social media.  
 
The media analysis revealed the existence of the phenomenon of TSF, but a case study was 
needed to understand its nature and to conceptualize it at higher level. After that, abductive 
reasoning (Magnani, 2001) was used in the analysis to further explain and understand the nature 
of TSF, in other words to develop explanatory hypotheses for the central phenomenon of the 
research. Haig (2005) distinguishes between phenomena detection and theory construction as 
part of abductive method. Both evidence from empirical material as well earlier theories can be 
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combined for constructing a new theory. According to Reichertz (2007), abductive inferencing is 
an attitude towards the data and towards one’s own knowledge, data are to be taken seriously, 
and the validity of previously developed knowledge is to be queried. The result is a theory which 
fits the surprising facts or solves the practical problem which arises from these (Kelle, 2007).  
 
Since many types of service failures exists, with highly differing scopes and consequences, we 
decided to document those that were a) connected in the media to a present or impending lack 
of sufficient resources and b) were attributed to systemic challenges. In Van de Walle’s (2016) 
terms, on cases of either failure by neglect (by the funders, not by the organization itself) or failure 
by design (insufficient resources). A total of 18 probable cases of TSF were identified and 
analyzed during that time. We believe that while those were located within Finland and in the 
context of Nordic welfare societies, the same processes take place in also other types of 
communities, in possibly less easily observable but equally strong forms. 
 
The identification stage was followed by a confirmation phase, where we sought evidence of the 
tactic in action. In this, we followed Ketokivi and Choi’s (2014) observation that case research can 
be effectively used also for theory testing, particularly in situations that are highly context-bound. 
We felt that even as the theory to be tested was currently formed just as a hypothesis (“a 
marketing viewpoint explains why public service providers make some failures public”), it was 
dependent on the Nordic public service funding model, and thus highly suitable for verification by 
a case study. Using a single case, we sought to prove the existence of the phenomenon, and to 
provide roots for further research into the topic. We chose a single case methodology because 
the concept is introduced and has not yet reached the status of a theory that can be used to 
compare different cases (cf.  Flyvjberg 2004). Stake (2005) refers to singular cases as entities 
that have some kind of boundaries. They are usually seen as the “one” and it is specific. In this 
article, we are concentrating on a case (municipality), but at the same time we are aiming at 
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finding a new definition on a phenomenon, which cannot be seen as a singular case. On the other 
hand Stake (2005, p. 445) defines a case study as an instrumental one, if the aim is to “provide 
an insight into an issue”. This is what we sought to do. 
 
We therefore located and interviewed two former city officials whose organization, a service 
development unit in a mid-size Finnish municipality, had utilized this identified tactic in the public 
healthcare sector. A preliminary set of questions was sent to Interviewee A and answered by 
email in 2015, after which a live interview was organized in 2016. A second informant was located 
in 2017 and interviewed on the phone. Both interviews followed a focused, semi-structured form 
in which elaborative questions were asked (as per Kvale & Brinkmann, 2014). The first live 
interview lasted 64 minutes, the second one 33 minutes. The results were completely transcribed 
and coded by [second author], after which the coding was checked and confirmed by the two 
other authors, both of whom had extensive expertise in the use of qualitative research methods. 
Each of the three authors first analyzed the data separately, after which it was discussed together 
by all three authors.  
 
FINDINGS 
Based on a triangulation of the interviews and the media analysis, we constructed a process 
formulation of how TSF usually takes place. We illustrate it here with anonymized quotes from 
the interview. Unless noted otherwise, all quotes here come from the first live interview. Several 
details have been omitted due to ethical proofreading, which requires that in sensitive topics, the 
researcher should always assume that the results end up read by parties hostile to the informants, 
should they be identifiable (Lee 1993). Likewise, our number of informants is limited, because of 
the whistleblower nature of the information we needed to gather. We believe that the results 




Our central finding was the identification of the phenomenon in question as an actual practice, 
thus confirming our hypothesis that had been constructed based on the media analysis: TSF, as 
a marketing phenomenon, exists. It is based on a tactical use of failure and media exposure. We 
also identified situations in which the practice would probably arise, and the way in which people 
in charge of using it considered it a last-ditch effort, but also something that arose from a 
consistent earlier media relationship (a fact emphasized especially by Interviewee B). Without 
earlier efficient media relations and visibility, it is very difficult to utilize TSF, as it requires both 
marketing expertise and good, reliable media contacts. In the following sections, we analyze and 
elaborate the findings in the context of existing theory. 
 
Next, the nature and function of TSF is briefly explained and illustrated based on the empirical 
data of this study. Figure 1 shows the main entities in the context of public service government, 
provision, and consumption, as well as the role and function of TSF in marketing in marketing of 
public service. 
 




Four main entities exist in the context of public service government, provision, and consumption. 
They are the buyer, public service provider organization, consumers of public service, and society. 
In a democratic society voters elect the politicians to represent them in the public government, 
thus giving them the decision-making authority. Similarly, tax payers give funding to their 
representatives to cover the cost of public spending.  
 
The buyer is the public government body that makes the buying decision of the public service. In 
our case study it is the municipality, however it can be any other body of the public government 
authorized for public procurement of certain service, product or solution. Elected politicians hold 
the highest decision making authority in the public government. However, at operational level, the 
officials working for public government bodies have a major role in the decision-making in the 
procurement of public services. The government body negotiates with the public service provider 
organization about the terms and details of the public service being procured. The funding of the 
public service provider organization comes from the public government body functioning as a 
buyer. Our data suggest that the negotiations may in certain circumstances be dictation with little 
understanding or concern about the realities in which the public service organization functions. 
This is what triggers the public service provision organization to use TSF. 
 
The public service provider organization takes care of the daily production and delivery of the 
public service. In our empirical case, the service organization provided health and wellbeing 
services to the citizens of the municipality.  
 
Consumers of public service are those who use the public service. Consumers of public service 
are often voter and taxpayers as well, thus having several roles in our model. However, this is not 
always the case. Small children consume health care and educational services, and visitors from 
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foreign countries can use library during their stay. Indeed, not all public service consumers are 
voters and tax payers of the society. The consumption of public services causes the societal 
impact. The impact is that the society has citizens who are healthier, more educated, and have 
better quality of life, for example.  
 
Our data shows that the need for TSF emerges from the contradiction between the buyer and 
provider of public service about the funding and terms public service being procured. The buyer 
of the public service is a monopsony in our case study, namely a municipality. This makes the 
bargaining position most difficult to the public service provider organization. It easily leads into a 
situation where the service provider does not have adequate resources to fulfill its obligations. 
Still, the blame of bad service is allocated to the service provider, not to the representatives of the 
buyer. The data of this study show that in such a desperate situation the public service provider 
can use TSF in marketing its service, and to legitimate the quantity and quality of the service, and 
fundamentally even its own the existence. TSF represents a radical and direct short cut between 
the public service provider and society to manipulate the public opinion into favorable for the 
needs and objectives of the service provider. By purposely and systematically affecting the public 
opinion the public service provider creates pressure from the society to the elected politicians and 
officials of the public government body responsible for procurement of the public service. The 
public pressure is created to change the funding conditions and other terms of the procurement 
to be more favorable to the public service provider. TSF is explained in more detail in the following 
deductive analysis based on our empirical data and also findings from earlier research.  
 
ANALYSIS 
In our study, we identified the existence of TSF with media analysis. Then, with an empirical case 
study we examined the role and function of TSF in marketing of public service (Figure 1). Next, 
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we further our analysis on TSF with abductive reasoning, based on both the empirical material in 
hand as well as earlier research literature. 
 
The tactics of non-adequate service 
“We made calculations that [showed that] if we did not get the funding, [a large amount of 
time] by the staff would go into basic customer service and not requested [service] development, 
as it was supposed to…. And we made that public.” 
 
Wilson et al. (2006, p. 105) define customer gap as the difference between customer expectations 
and customer perceptions about service. For most service providers, it is optimal to provide 
service that falls somewhere between what customers desire and what they find adequate. Going 
below adequate creates complaints, whereas systematic exceeding of expectations raises the 
bar of what customers consider to be the baseline. For certain public service providers, however, 
going below adequate can be an effective strategy. If the service provided is too good, the demand 
will exceed supply even more. It is the paradoxical situation where a service provider does not 
want more customers and even starts a process of demarketing, or in other words, the reduction 
of demand (see Kotler & Levy, 1971). This is especially true of service providers the metrics of 
which are insufficient to measure what they actually provide, and/or those that are under the threat 
of significant funding cuts. 
 
The logic behind the move is that many organizations in the public sector have to operate in a 
service ecology in which their service propositions are not known well enough, especially not by 
those deciding on their funding. These are ecologies which the service providers themselves 
cannot control or possibly even influence. They thus turn to what means of influence they have, 
by selling their need. As described by Jobber and Lancaster (2009, p. 240), preparations for sales 
negotiations usually feature four elements that determine their success: availability of options for 
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each party, the information held by each, the need for recognition and satisfaction, and external 
and internal pressures upon each party. 
 
For many public sector service providers, this is a very dangerous combination. The funders are 
expected to make required budget cuts, they want public recognition for doing those, and they try 
to accomplish it in the least unpopular way. Simultaneously, the quality of information that they 
have on each service and its providers can be both obsolete and misleading. For example, it is 
quite possible that the councilman reducing library funding has not stepped inside a library for 20 
years, and has never used that library’s online services either. He thus thinks that all that happens 
there is the handing over of worn-out old novels, or that the librarian’s work is about cleaning dust 
from shelves. To fight this, certain organizations have started to broadcast their troubles in order 
to convince funders of their importance, as we found out in our media study. In a way, they 
outsource their P2F sales function to journalists who will dramatize the misery of their customers. 
They intentionally do not perform as well as they could, e.g., by not using overtime to compensate 
for staff reductions. The point of this move is that those in charge of the providers’ situations have 
to face the consequences of their decisions. It is a risky tactic, but it sometimes pays off. 
 
In some sense, this is a normal result of the logic that if budget cuts are too large, their results 
may become visible, and the provider should make sure that they really do. In other words, that 
remaining staff should not try and make up for the damage done, but rather refrain from extending 
their service. This makes it visible that the cuts have had an effect and it protects the staff from 
exhaustion caused by overworking. Tactical non-adequacy, however, takes things one stage 
further. In it, sympathy is sought by producing to the customers the image that the staff is doing 
all that it can to keep up the level of service quality. Yet despite their good intent, they simply 
cannot keep doing so, because of the cuts. While part of that projection is probably real – 
especially if the service provider actually has a healthy work ethic and good, loyal and professional 
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workers - but parts of it are carefully orchestrated performances. These performances are 
furthermore tailored to fit different target audiences and different funder types. 
 
Jobber and Lancaster (2009, p. 12) list key traits of successful salespersons. Many of them 
describe a tactically non-adequate service provider as well. In using TSF, the organization has to 
be determined, disciplined, and resilient, or the tactic will not work. The organization has to know 
how much of failure it will be able to sustain without permanent damage to its service provision 
ability. Likewise, it has to know about the risks of reputation damage and how far to take that line, 
because reputational failure can be just as dangerous as actual failure (Bromley, 2000). This is 
especially true for non-profit service providers (Sarstedt & Schloderer, 2011; Schloderer, Sarsted 
& Ringle, 2014). The ability to communicate is obviously important as well. Without it, the message 
of an impending doom will not reach the funders and the whole process will just appear to be a 
failure on the service provider’s part. This is however something that the organization will have to 
learn (or re-learn), because the existence of a situation where tactical non-adequacy is needed 
clearly points out that the provider’s needs were not communicated well enough to the funders 
before or in due time in the first place. 
 
That last criterion is particularly interesting: many public sector service providers are usually what 
they are precisely because they exist to provide empathetic, people-oriented things such as health 
care, teaching and welfare. They likely even have formal visions and missions centered on doing 
good. In desperately seeking funding through failure, they have to temporarily bracket that 
organizational empathy. Caring too much about their immediate customers would make them less 
able to utilize this tactical advantage to a sufficient extent. In other words, the non-adequacy has 
to be productified through public statements by customers as well as by the service providers 
themselves. This approach nevertheless seems to be just as useful for an empathy-bracketing 
daycare center as it is for seeking military funding. It appears that when in need, caregivers can 
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be just as ruthless in marketing as the members of governmental monopolies on violence are. 
Next, we analyze the way in which providers perform this P2F sales pitch. 
 
Selling through failure 
“Reporting concrete cases seemed to work more effectively. … We made sure we always 
had data to back up our argumentation.” 
 
“The fault fell on the officials … We collected customer feedback and made sure the 
customers were on our side.” 
 
Public actors can and do underperform in order to get more funding. In doing so, the actors are 
threatening that the public value will be deteriorating because their delivery of the services will 
have inferior quality. We build here on the idea of creating public value introduced by Moore 
(1995). The sales process is different in our example because the custom concept in TSF is 
diffuse and the creation of value is difficult to address. How public value and customer value are 
interrelated is important to address, but goes outside the scope of this article. We draw on the 
thoughts of Viio and Grönroos (2016), who state that the sales process should “strategically 
match…the buyer’s situation”. In our example, the buyer is society itself, represented by e.g., 
states and municipalities. 
 
Selling is first and foremost a promise that is either kept or not. In tactical non-adequacy, it is 
publicly made. It is then only kept to the extent that the service provider thinks should be 
considered reasonable under the current funding. The idea is to create a public relations pathway, 
in which the provider’s lack of an ability to sufficiently provide its duties is transported to those 
who decide on its resources. As described by Schloderer, Sarstedt and Ringle (2014), the 
affective dimension (e.g., likeability) of a non-profit organization seems to influence supporting 
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behaviors such as volunteering and donations more than does the cognitive dimension, which 
includes competence. We believe, however, that as far as public funding is concerned, the 
cognitive dimension holds more power. This is because of the contractual nature of public finance 
– the funding agency requires a sufficient level of service in return for its support. There are some 
similarities with B2B marketing where the seller has to face a more complicated buying process. 
The process of buying includes different levels of selling, in the form of convincing different 
organizational levels that a certain service is worthwhile. Dealing with these levels resembles 
dealing with a buying center (Webster and Wind, 1972) in classic B2B selling theories. Should 
the service provider fail the negotiated contract, the service promise made by the funder to the 
community through its financial support of that service provider fails, too. This opens a window of 
opportunity for a desperate service provider.  
 
The service provider aims its failure-threat marketing for one special segment: the funder’s need 
to deliver what it has promised to its citizens. The service provider, stuck in a monopsony, turns 
the tables at a crucial moment so that it in turn has a monopoly. In response to the single buyer’s 
(the funder’s) market, a single seller market too is created. By doing so, the provider shows that 
its fate is linked to that of the funder, and its failure will be the funder’s failure as well. This P2F 
marketing is based on knowing the primary customer’s need and threatening not to fulfill it. At the 
same time, the service provider is also marketing its problems to the wider public, its other 
customers included, in an apologetic manner: “We would love to serve you better, but…”  It attacks 
what Nutt (2006) calls the “fickle oversight” of public service – the fact that elected officials must 
cater to various stakeholder groups, and may bow even at the pressure of one of those. 
 
This is public relations work par excellence, as close to its propaganda roots as possible: 
deliberate, planned and sustained, used to indoctrinate and to create loyalty. Therefore, customer 
needs are at the center of the planning, but utilized as a threat instead of being served. This can 
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be considered market targeting to the extreme: the organization is showing that it cannot serve 
the other customers (e.g., patients), in order to show that its primary customer – the funder – has 
to keep paying for its services at a good enough price. The company objective of that service 
provider is of course to keep serving those other customers (e.g., patients, library patrons). To 
get the money to do that, however, it must temporarily neglect their needs. The service provider 
simultaneously has to position itself in the market so that it is obvious that the fault does not lie 
within that organization itself, but rather those who finance it. It does this with a special type of 
sales cycle, the TSF pitch, to which we turn next. 
 
The sales pitch of failure 
“So the CEO started lobbying and made [local media] into a partner and stakeholder,   and 
we were quite open about things … so in the end, we actually got the money, but like after about 
six more months of pointless grinding.” 
 
“We made sure we were in the media every week or so.” 
 
As we have explained above, the process of securing future funding in a crisis situation is, for a 
public sector service provider, very much like a sales pitch. The funders are its primary targets. 
In other words, while it may provide forms of service to others, those who in the public eye are 
thought of as its “customers” (e.g., a community hospital to citizens), they are not the ones who 
pay the bills. The same way as a salesperson in a B2B situation needs to reach the person who 
actually decides on the customer’s use of money (such as the CFO), the P2F sales pitch has to 
reach the funders in e.g., municipality government. As noted above, the challenge in the situation 
is that the provider works in a monopsony market: there is only one customer, that customer either 
buys or not, and is able to define the “price” at its own rate. Therefore, P2F selling is about selling 
value propositions and seeing how much can be haggled. At the core is the threat that if the key 
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customer pays too little, it too will suffer, as the lower value it purchases will prevent it from fulfilling 
its own value propositions (expectations and obligations) to others. 
 
This leads to a tricky balance of fear, in which few of the key rules of selling apply, but the 
principles of it still very much do. For example, of the criteria listed by Moncrief and Marshall 
(2005) as central characteristics of modern selling, some become redundant while others are 
emphasized: customer retention is utterly crucial, and customer deletion practically impossible. 
Therefore, customer relationship management becomes extremely important. However, in a 
situation requiring tactical non-adequacy, it is likely that the customer relationship has already 
gone sour. Customer databases are not usually necessary, because of the monopsony, unless 
the service provider wants to play dirty and has inside information on e.g., individual city council 
members. 
 
Customer data management is not necessary either, except in cases where it could be utilized to 
show that the organization is being judged with unsuitable metrics. The TSF process itself is about 
marketing the service, just with an atypical touch to it. This in turn makes the organization to want 
to emphasize its ability to solve problems, should it be allowed to function as a system (e.g., by 
showing that cuts here will lead to fatal inefficiency, and how it can work wonders if no big cuts 
are made). And, finally, tactical non-adequacy is about saying that if the lowest bidding “price” is 
not met, the providers can neither satisfy the needs of the customer, nor help offer more value. 
 
The decision is therefore framed for the funder through both economic and social purchase 
criteria. If they do not buy the service from this particular provider, they will face social 
consequences and a loss of reputation. Likewise, if they make the decision on too tightly fixed 
economic criteria, they will not get the value that they need, and again lose reputation. Used 
against elected politicians, this is in theory a remarkably efficient pitch, as long as those politicians 
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are not able to hide behind a crowd of peers (James et al., 2016). In practice, such hiding is 
exactly what happens, so more drastic measures may be used to respond to this. Like Blackwell, 
Miniard and Engel (2003) point out, the decision process towards buying starts with need 
identification or problem awareness. What the tactical non-adequacy seeks to establish is the 
situation where e.g., politicians need to openly acknowledge the problem, and must thus initiate 
a purchasing process. The tool for accomplishing this is a final push tactic, the unavoidable media 
exposure. It functions as an aggressive sales proposition: “if you don’t buy, we’ll make sure you 
pay for it in massive reputation damage”. Whether it fails or succeeds is a combination of pitching 
skill, optimal media exposure, and risk assessments made by the politicians it targets. 
 
DISCUSSION 
Cases of these media exposure tactics are plentiful, in addition to our single case example here. 
In Finland for example, several such topics arose during 2013-2016, identified in our media study. 
For example, a day after large government funding cuts to the mobile police were announced, a 
major newspaper ran an article on recent increases in speeding violations and DUIs, obviously 
pointing to the need of a sufficient police presence to counter this. A major hospital in Southern 
Finland had front-page coverage of the length of their emergency room waiting lines. When a 
large city near the capital had to cut down school funding, particularly in special needs education, 
the crisis immediately entered public discourse. And when the Finnish Meteorological Institute 
had to reduce the money they spent on pollen detection and reporting, they made at once very 
sure that it too was on the Internet and the newspapers – with allergic people worriedly spreading 
the news on Facebook. In each case, the coverage sparked public debate on what exactly are 
appropriate targets for funding cuts, and in many cases netted the organizations significant 
concessions. And remarkably, not in a single case was the publicity of underperformance 
problematic for the service providers themselves. It appears that the tactic is indeed working, and 




“We stated openly that if funding was not provided, we could not do certain [very 
necessary] things…. Our CEO used this as a weapon, … that even if it was required by law, we 
could not provide the service.” 
 
It forces the monopsony buyer to publicly state that it was a mistake to cut the funding, or to 
explain why they chose to cut it, possibly even in career-destructive terms. It is therefore important 
to reach elected officials’ reputations with the pitch – while it may well be the official in the 
municipality government who decided on the cuts initially, they tend not to suffer from reputation 
damage the same way as elected politicians do. Therefore, the plan is to touch those who would 
suffer. Even if the elected officials do not sit on the money, they are the ones who more often than 
not have the final say on how it is used, and they are the ones who stand to lose the most through 
reputation damage. This is a factor of what Walton and Hume (2012) consider the controllability 
aspect of public service failure attribution: the public must think that it was the politicians who had 
control over the factors that led to the failure. A smart public sector service provider thus gets the 
politicians, through media, to force the other stakeholders’ hands. 
 
 “We first and foremost communicated about the situation to the citizens of the municipality 
… so as to remind people that the changes were being made not for organizational advantage, 
but to [keep the central focus on] customer needs and their connection to the city’s resource 
situation … what we considered the sort of [financial] crash. … We decided that we would not try 
and explain, but rather utilize a realistic perspective on why we were enacting the changes.” 
 
To introduce business thinking and concepts in the public sector context is nothing new. We are 
aware of the discourse of new public management where business concepts and tools are 
introduced in the public sector setting in order to drive efficiency and quality (e.g., Hood, 1991). 
23 
 
The novelty in this article is to scrutinize especially how the public sector sales function differs 
from the private sector setting. As noted by both our interviewee and the respondents of Parker, 
Kaufman-Scarborough and Parker (2007), public service providers may have to market the 
importance of their activities. They do this first and foremost to their own “management” above – 
the people who decide their funding. Part of this is the marketing of the providers’ employees’ 
skills, rather than the service itself. One key way for doing so is through service visibility, the 
strategic revealing of interesting parts of a service process to customers in order to make them 
more aware of the quality of service that they are receiving (Harviainen, 2014). In essence, it is a 
way of altering the value proposition process through explanation and exposition. 
 
Tactical non-adequacy follows the same principle, but intentionally reveals pain points in the 
service instead, preferable of the migraine type, points that are associated with funding cuts. It 
can thus be seen as an organizational revelation of production processes, in which the provider 
creates an image of potential service quality. It then states that it cannot reach (or preserve) that 
quality level within the current limitations or with the future threats that the organization is facing. 
Through this dissonance, it seeks to secure the pressure needed to exert commitment from the 
funders, either directly or (more commonly) with the pressurizing help of public opinion. The pitch 
can be summed up as “we are essentially great, and people can see that – but if you force us 
down, we will drag you down with us.” 
 
“The city owned [the primary media channel], so [the key politicians wanting funding cuts 
to take place] used that to totally cut off our access to it. That created a media blackout on our 
situation.” 
 
Centrally, tactical non-adequacy is not a method that can be repeated several times over. It is a 
desperate last-minute plea, and to do it one time too many turns the organization into a beggar in 
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the eyes of the funders. It is then no longer a service provider, but a money-demander, and thus 
needs to be cut off. This is a kind of sales forecast, where the management sees that without this 
one crucial deal, a point of no return as far as funding goes will be crossed. To not engage in TSF 
at that point seems like doom for the organization (or at least some of its key members’ careers), 
so it appears worth the risk. 
 
On the other hand, if a public organization makes a successful TSF pitch, it will be forced 
thereafter to really perform much better. What it effectively buys reciprocally in return with the 
successful sale is that it now lives on borrowed time. It will be put down (or at least its managers 
will be fired) if the funders do not see significant results in return for their investment. Likewise, if 
the TSF attempt fails, similar things are likely to happen, because the publicity will then not protect 
those who were in charge of the media influence operation. Whether public service providers can 
prosper enough under these tight parameters remains to be seen. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
“We had discussed beforehand who would say what [to the media], so that we would be 
systematic [in our communication].” 
 
This article has discussed and presented the existence and processes of tactical service failure, 
as well as shown how a marketing perspective explains certain phenomena in public sector 
funding. At first glance, public sector service providers may seem very different from companies 
in the ways they sell their services. Companies’ first duty is to create profit, hopefully with both 
ethical means and environmentally sustainable methods. Public sector service providers cannot 
do that. At the core, however, they both seek to survive and prosper and to attract the best 
possible people. If a company cannot create profit, it goes bankrupt and perishes, and a public 
sector organization with its funding cut is just as dead. Therefore, they both sell their services, in 
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the same ways, just mostly to different directions. It is, at the end, a question about who pays for 
the purchases, not about who uses the actual service. 
 
We believe that this connection requires further study. Public sector organizations, no matter 
whether they provide administrative, productive or supportive service, are in truth just as sales-
oriented as their commercial compatriots. Their marketing strategies and especially internal 
audiences are just different (Ewing & Caruana, 2000). The way they sell may look strange to the 
untrained eye, but it is not at all any more different than the ways in which sales tactics may have 
to differ from one product to the next, between B2C, C2C, and B2B, or especially between selling 
solutions, products, and services. To improve the ways in which the public sector functions, we 
have to understand how it approaches its own types of sales, not think that it is not selling 
anything. No one is as efficient at a hard sell as is a public sector service provider whose funding 
is about to be cut. This is something from which also commercial service companies could – and 
should – learn a lot. 
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